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STRIKING THE ROCK: CONFRONTING GENDER EQUALITY IN
SOUTH AFRICA'
Penelope E. Andrews*
This Article analyzes the status of women's rights in the newly
democratic South Africa. It examines rights guaranteed in the
Constitution and conflicts between the principle of gender equality and
the recognition of indigenous law and institutions. The Article focuses
on the South African transition to democracy and the influence that
feminist agitation at the international level has had on South African
women's attempts at political organization. After dissecting the
historical position of customary law in South Africa and questioning
its place in the new democratic regime. The author argues that,
although South African women have benefited from the global feminist
endeavor, they have adopted the shape and substance of women's rights
to accommodate conditions peculiar to South Africa. The Article
concludes that this balancing of respect for indigenous culture and the
ultimate goal of eradication of all forms of sexism provides the best
means for women in South Africa to make progress in their quest for
equal status in that society.
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t The phrase "striking the rock" first made its way into South African political
parlance in the 1950s, when a large number of women marched on Pretoria to protest
the application of "pass laws" to African women. "Pass laws" required all Africans to
carry passes (identity documents) which described both their status and the geo-
graphical areas in which they were permitted. The central piece of legislation was the
Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 and its subsidiary regulations. Section
10 of the Act contained the key provisions and, with certain exceptions, stated that it
was illegal for a Black person to remain in a prescribed (White) area for longer than
seventy-two hours. Penny Andrews, The Legal Underpinnings of Gender Oppression in
Apartheid South Africa, 3 AuSTL. J.L. & SOC'Y 92, 97 (1986). Until that period the pass
laws had not applied to women, and the official shift in policy pushed women to
protest. The women said to the Prime Minister: "'Wathint' abafazi, wathint' imbokodo,
uzokufa'-'now you have touched the women you have struck a rock, you have
dislodged a boulder, you will be crushed.' " HILDA BERNSTEIN, FOR THEIR TRIUMPHS
& FOR THEIR TEARS 90 (1985).
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INTRODUCTION
Women, through creative advocacy, enlarged the concept of
the new South African democracy early in the long and difficult
process of constitutional negotiation, when they insisted that their
concerns be included.1 Before women forced their concerns to the
fore, only the urgent task of abolishing apartheid and designing the
new non-racial order occupied the attention of the architects of the
new South African democracy.2 The leading parties to the negotia-
tions, namely the African National Congress and the Nationalist
Party, had political and legal differences about the shape and sub-
stance of the post-apartheid order.3 There was, however, a general
consensus that racism, in all its manifestations, needed to be eradicated.4
1. Catherine Albertyn, Women and the Transition to Democracy in South Africa, in
GENDER AND THE NEW SouTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 39, 60-61 (Christina Murray
ed., 1994). In this piece, Albertyn assesses "the extent to which [the architects of the
new order] took account of the experiences, interests and demands of women in
South Africa:' and concludes that women "succeeded in obtaining an equal com-
mitment to race and gender equality in the preamble and the constitutional
principles." Id. (footnotes omitted). Albertyn points out that there were limits to what
women could achieve:
[T]he form which [equality rights] took and the status of the equality
guarantee in the Bill of Rights were issues which had to be negoti-
ated, defended and fought for by women and other groups. Here the
energy and resources of women were consumed by the battle over
customary law and the equality clause. As a result there was less or
no intervention by women's organizations on such important issues
as the wording of the equality clause, the status of affirmative action,
the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, and the inclusion of a
clause which would ensure that equality trumped other rights and
effective enforcement mechanisms.
Id. at 61 (footnotes omitted).
2. See generally ALBIE SACHS, ADVANCING HUMAN RiGHTS IN SouTH AFRICA
(1992) (discussing the negotiation process that led to the formulation of the South
African Constitution).
3. Reference to the negotiations in this Article refers to CODESA I (the first
multi-party Convention for a Democratic South Africa), which commenced in
December 1991; the second session, CODESA II, which commenced in May
1992; and the third session, normally referred to as the Multi-Party Negotiating
Forum or the World Trade Center Talks, which commenced in April 1993, after a
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Eradicating sexism was not on the agenda, but even at the
margins of discussions negotiators had to deal with this vexing is-
sue. The entrance into the process of an organized women's lobby
confronted the delegates with a largely ignored reality: the legal and
economic edifice of apartheid had, both in the public and private
realms, generated and reinforced the dispossession, discrimination,
and subjugation of women.5 Although oppression of women had
been obscured by the larger issue of racial oppression, anti-apartheid
political rhetoric occasionally referred to the plight of women.6 The
possibility of imminent democratic transformation, however,
required more than political rhetoric. Women sought to ensure
that this transformation included a commitment to changing
many aspects of their lives. A vocal and determined women's
lobby demanded that the largely male delegation pay attention to
women's concerns.7
This Article analyzes the interaction of indigenous law and
women's equality in the newly democratic South Africa by ex-
amining rights guaranteed in the Constitution and possible conflicts
between the principle of gender equality and the recognition of tra-
ditional law and institutions. It focuses on the historic moment of
the South African transition to democracy and the influence that
feminist agitation at the international level bore on women's organ-
izational attempts within South Africa. It also investigates the
historic place of customary law within the South African legal and
political framework and whether it can be accommodated institu-
tionally in the new democratic dispensation. The Article suggests
that, although South African women have benefited from the global
feminist endeavor, they have adopted the shape and substance of
women's rights to accommodate conditions peculiar to South Africa.
lengthy breakdown over violence and key constitutional issues. For an insightful
account of the negotiations, refer to ALLISTER SPARKS, TOMORROW IS ANOTHER
COUNTRY (1995). See also THE SMALL MIRACLE: SOUTrH AFRICA'S NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT (S. Friedman & D. Atkinson eds., 1994) (analyzing race relations, the
ANC, and politics and government generally in the period from 1989 to 1994, and
making predictions for the years after 1994).
4. Id.
5. See Andrews, supra note *, at 102; see also FATIMA MEER, WOMEN IN THE
APARTHEID SOCIETY (1985).
6. Anti-apartheid rhetoric displayed a paradox: on the one hand, it linked
women's subordination to the laws and policies of apartheid; on the other hand, the
rhetoric often reflected patriarchal protective attitudes. For example, Judge Albie
Sachs, a member of the Constitutional Court, has described patriarchy as "one of the
few profoundly non-racial institutions in South Africa." Albie Sachs, Judges and
Gender: The Constitutional Rights of Women in a Post-Apartheid South Afica, 7 AGENDA
1, 1(1990).
7. See generally Albertyn, supra note 1.
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Women have attempted to strike a balance between respect for
indigenous culture and the eradication of all forms of sexism.
I. FEMINIST CONCERNS AND STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE:
THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE
The political events in South Africa in the early 1990s oc-
curred on the heels of a well orchestrated campaign by feminists
across the globe that had brought women's issues from the mar-
gins of political and legal discourse to a place where women's
concerns and priorities were accorded some formal recognition.'
Evidence of these developments is found in the United Nations
Decade for Women,9 the 1993 Vienna Conference, 10 the 1994 Cairo
Conference," and the Fourth World Conference in Beijing? 2
8. See generally Rebecca J. Cook, Women's International Human Rights Law: The
Way Forward, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 3 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (examining
a consultation of lawyers who sought to develop legal strategies to promote and
protect women's international human rights).
9. The United Nations Decade for Women represented an intensification of
efforts to achieve objectives of equality, development, peace, employment, health,
and education. Report of the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women:
Equality, Development and Peace, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.94/35 (1980); Report of the World
Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for
Women: Equality, Development and Peace, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.116/28/Rev.1 (1985); see
also Andrea E. Stumpf, Re-examining the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women: The UN Decade for Women Conference in Nairobi, 10
YALE J. INT'L L. 384 (1985) (discussing the Convention and briefly chronicling its
origin and operation).
10. At this conference, feminists lobbied extensively in favor of recognizing that
violence against women is a violation of human rights. The conference culminated in
the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 104, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 111, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1993). See Donna J.
Sullivan, Note, Women's Human Rights and the 1993 World Conference on Human
Rights, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 152, 152 (1994) ("[T]he conference crystallized a political
consensus that various forms of violence against women should be examined within
the context of human rights standards and in conjunction with gender discrimina-
tion.").
11. The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo
addressed, among other topics, women's reproductive health issues. Feminists
lobbied extensively to ensure that the debate included women's perspectives, al-
though individual women's perspectives differed in relation to questions of birth
control and particularly abortion. The conference produced the Programme of Action
of the International Conference on Population and Development, Report of the International
Conference on Population and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (1994). See
Rhonda Copelon, Sexual and Reproductive Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH
AFRICA FROM A GENDER PERSPEcTIVE 190, 198-201 (Sandra Liebenberg ed., 1995).
12. The Fourth World Conference was by far the most significant United Nations
conference for women during the decade. Women lobbied the governmental delega-
tions extensively and organized a parallel non-governmental conference to coincide
with the formal proceedings. The conference produced the Beijing Declaration and
Striking the Rock
Western feminists 3 initiated the theoretical onslaught in the
international law arena by demanding a more vigorous enforce-
ment of international law, particularly human rights law, and also
called for greater gender sensitivity in United Nations enforcement
mechanisms and procedures. 4
In the Western world, a groundswell of scholarship and activ-
ism flowed from significant legal and policy successes toward the
eradication of discrimination against women.16 In the last few dec-
ades, feminist jurisprudence has made an important contribution to
Programme of Action, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.177/20 (1995). The document bolsters the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, 34th
Sess., Agenda Item 75, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW], by
providing a program of action for governments to address women's rights. See
Margaret Plattner, The Status of Women Under International Human Rights Law and the
1995 UN World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, 84 KY. L.J. 1249, 1254-60, 1263-73
(1996) (discussing both CEDAW and the Beijing Conference); Elizabeth L. Larson,
Comment, United Nations Fourth Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Develop-
ment, and Peace (Beijing, China: September 1995), 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 695 (1996)
(same).
13. By "Western feminists:' I refer to women in North America, Western Europe,
and Australia. These countries generally share a dominant European culture, demo-
cratic or social-democratic political systems, free-market economies, and similar
levels of economic development. For a detailed discussion on the feminist movement
in Europe and the United States, refer to THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND WESTERN EuROPE (Mary Fainsod Katzenstein & Carol McClurg Mueller
eds., 1987). See also Susan Ryan, Australia's Sex Discrimination and Affirmative Action
Legislation, 8 J. IRISH SOC'Y FOR LAB. L. 10 (1989) (discussing the passage of the Sex
Discrimination and Affirmative Action statutes in Australia during the author's
tenure as Minister on the Status of Women and the statute's projected impact on the
economic empowerment of women).
14. For a feminist critique of the mechanisms and procedures of the United
Nations, see Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991). See generally Cook, supra note 8 (discussing the effect of the
women's movement on international human rights).
15. Note that "successes" refer to incremental attitudinal changes as well as
positive legislative and judicial steps. The list is extensive, but a few examples are
worth noting here. In Australia, the legislature passed the Sex Discrimination Act,
1984, No. 4 (Austl.), and the Affirmative Action (Equal Employment Opportunity
For Women) Act, 1986, No. 91 (Austl.). See CHRIS RONALDS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
AND SEX DIScRIMINATION (1987). In the United States, women scored major victories
in the courts. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (affirming the right to have an
abortion); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (upholding an
affirmative action plan using gender as a factor in promotion and hiring).
16. Obviously the legislative inroads into sexism were not monolithic in the
West, and huge differences between, and even within, countries existed. It is fair to
argue, however, that within these societies there was a consensus about the need to
work toward the goal of gender equality. This was certainly true at the formal legal
level. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture,
Courts, and Feminism, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 15 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne
Kennedy eds., 1991) (examining the role of the courts with respect to gender
equality).
SPRING 1998]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 3:307
the field of legal theory. It has succeeded in transforming many
areas of domestic law, forcing accommodation of women's experi-
ences. 17 A cursory glance at the areas of criminal law (particularly
rape and domestic battery), family law, and anti-discrimination law,
reveals the impact of feminist jurisprudence." Although the male
bias in the law persists, the situation of certain women has improved
dramatically in the past few decades, and this change is a direct
result of feminist law reform efforts.19
Buoyed by their achievements in law and policy, Western
feminists turned their attention to international issues. One signifi-
cant reason for this shift in focus was the United Nations declaration
of the Decade for Women, which provided an opportunity for femi-
nist activists and scholars from the developed world to interact with
their counterparts in the developing world. 2° The growing presence
of women from developing countries on the international stage was
another reason that Western feminists became more aware of inter-
national issues. Women from developing countries formed strategic
21political coalitions with Western feminists around specific issues.
17. See CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW (1987); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 829, 838-43 (1990) (discussing how perspectives advanced by women have
changed American law).
18. See HESTER EISENSTEIN, INSIDE AGITATORS 50-64 (1996) (reviewing recent
feminist achievements in Australian law). Eisenstein lists strategies adopted by
feminists to change the apparatus of the Australian state for the benefit of women.
She analyzes the successes and limitations of these strategies in light of the dominant
male political culture and changing economic climate in the mid-to-late 1980s. Id.; see
also Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding
the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267 (1985) (focusing on the appro-
priate criminal justice response to battering); Robert V. Ward, A Kinder, Gentler
System: An Examination of How Crime Victims Have Benefited from the Women's Move-
ment, 15 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 171 (1989) (discussing how the
issues first raised by feminists made a crime victims' movement possible). For a
personal narrative regarding involvement in women's struggles and various strate-
gies adopted to improve the situation of women, see PATRICIA IRELAND, WHAT
WOMEN WANT (1996).
19. See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Women's
Advancement in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 323 (1995). In this article
the author provides a detailed account of women in the legal profession and of
strides made by certain women in this largely male-dominated profession. Id.; See
also MARGARET THORNTON, DISSONANCE AND DISTRUST: WOMEN IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1996) (providing a sober reflection on the impediments women face in
the legal profession in Australia).
20. See Stumpf, supra note 9 (looking briefly at the United Nations Decade for
Women and presenting the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) for reexamination).
21. For a thoughtful discussion that illustrates this point, see Julie Mertus &
Pamela Goldberg, A Perspective on Women and International Human Rights After the
Vienna Declaration: The Inside/Outside Construct, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 201
(1994).
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This period of change coincided with widespread political upheaval
in some Third World countries, where popular movements were
attempting to unseat non-democratic minority governments.2
In recent years feminist scholars have called for an expanded
definition and operation of international law, one that recognizes the
"fundamentally skewed nature of international law" that privileges
men and ignores the interests of women."3 While recognizing vast
economic, geographical, cultural, and social differences between
women in the developed world and their counterparts in the devel-
oping world, feminist scholars nevertheless have suggested a
collective mobilization of women against male domination. A lead-
ing Western feminist has argued that
[i]ssues raised by Third World feminists ... require a
reorientation of feminism to deal with the problem of
the most oppressed women, rather than those of the
most privileged. Nevertheless, the constant theme in
both Western and Third World feminism is the chal-
lenge to structures that permit male domination,
although the form of the challenge and the male struc-
ture may differ from society to society. An international
feminist perspective on international law will have as
its goal the rethinking and revision of those structures
and principles which exclude women's voices.'
Therefore, a feminist perspective on international law challenges the"masculine world of international law"2 in its content, organiza-
tional structure, procedure, and enforcement mechanisms.'
22. The political situation in many countries during this period supports this
point. In South Africa, for example, women involved in the national liberation strug-
gle aligned themselves with international solidarity endeavors. Women in Nicaragua
followed the same pattern. See Barbara J. Seitz, From Home to Street: Women and
Revolution in Nicaragua, in WOMEN TRANSFORMING POLITICS 162 (Jill M. Bystydzienski
ed., 1992); see also bell hooks, Sisterhood: Political Solidarity Between Women, 23
FEMIIST REV. 125 (1986) (arguing that women must live and work in solidarity in
order to build a sustained feminist movement).
23. Charlesworth et al., supra note 14, at 615. The Charlesworth article is
regarded as the pioneering article in this area of analysis. The authors "argue that
both the structures of international lawmaking and the content of the rules of inter-
national law privilege men; if women's interests are acknowledged at all, they are
marginalized. International law is a thoroughly gendered system." Id. at 614-15.
24. Id. at 621.
25. Id.
26. See Andrew Byrnes, Toward More Effective Enforcement of Women's Human
Rights Through the Use of International Human Rights Law and Procedures, in HUMAN
RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 8, at 189; see also Geraldine A. del Prado, The United
Nations and the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women: How Well Has the
Organization Fulfilled Its Responsibility?, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 51 (1995)
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Feminist activists, particularly those from the developing
countries involved in the decolonization process, have engaged in
sophisticated and partially successful lobbying of the United Nations
to ensure that the organization more vigorously pursues women's
rights.27 The adoption by the United Nations of the CEDAWu was a
political milestone for women activists. CEDAW provides a compre-
hensive legal framework designed to ensure equality for women.2 It
outlines the major legal and social structures that impede women's
rights and opportunities, and it specifies measures that state parties
who ratify CEDAW must take to eliminate such discriminatory
structures." In relation to cultural matters, CEDAW describes how
state parties must modify the conduct of their citizens in order to
eliminate all practices which incorporate the idea of the inferiority of
either of the sexes or set up stereotyped roles for men and women."
Since the adoption of CEDAW, pressure by female lobbyists
has ensured that women's issues remain on the global agenda. The
political momentum made the adoption of the Vienna Declaration
on Violence Against Women32 possible and it renewed dedication to
the principles and aims of CEDAW in the Beijing Platform for
Action.3
Despite formidable obstacles to women's equality in a vast ar-
ray of economic, social, and political areas, there now exists a highly
(discussing the extent of the United Nations' success in achieving gender equality via
policy pronouncements and treaties).
27. See Mertus & Goldberg, supra note 21, at 207-16. The authors describe the
vigorous lobbying efforts of various feminist groups, the resultant conflicts, and the
difficult process of achieving compromise as feminists from the "North" and the
"South" lobbied to incorporate their agendas into the final conference report. Id.
28. CEDAW, supra note 12.
29. Id. at 1. "[D]iscrimination against women is incompatible with human
dignity and the welfare of society and constitutes an obstacle to the full realization of
the potentialities of women." Id. For a detailed tabulation of global developments
with respect to women's human rights, see UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
INFORMATION, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN 1945-1996
(1996). For a comprehensive list of international documents that incorporate
women's rights, refer to WINSTON E. LANGLEY, WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
DOCUMENTS (1991). See also A THEMATIC GUIDE TO DOCUMENTS ON THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OF WOMEN (Gudmundur Alfredsson & Katarina Tomasevski eds., 1995)
(providing relevant international standards grouped by subject matter).
30. CEDAW, supra note 12, at 2-10; see also Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J.
INT'L L. 643 (1990) (arguing that CEDAW obligates state parties to provide the means
to move progressively toward elimination of discrimination against women).
31. CEDAW, supra note 12, at 4.
32. See Mertus & Goldberg, supra note 21.
33. Valerie A. Dormady, Note, Women's Rights in International Law: A Prediction
Concerning the Legal Impact of the United Nations' Fourth World Conference on Women,
30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 97 (1997).
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organized, politically astute, articulate, and vocal cadre of femi-
nists' who have committed themselves to eradicating the vestiges
of patriarchy, not only within their borders, but on a global scale.?6
However, their activities have raised a few concerns, not because of
disagreement with the ultimate goal of women's equality, but because
of reservations concerning tactics. These concerns arise from cam-
paigns tinged by a certain evangelism that accompanies much of
the writing and the resultant activism. This evangelism surfaces
in discussions about traditional or religious law, and it becomes
particularly animated with regard to certain traditional practices,
such as polygamy and female genital surgeries. 7 For the impartial
34. The large volume of literature focusing on the rights of women makes this
point. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 8 (discussing the effect of the women's movement on
international human rights); Karen Busby, The Maleness of Legal Language, 18
MANITOBA L.J. 191 (1989) (arguing that sexist language must be eliminated in order
to eliminate sexism); Diane Crothers, Owning the Power of the Law, 20 HuM. RTS. 12
(1993) (arguing that women must exercise their rights to participate at all levels of
the legal system in order to effect change); Lisa R. Pruitt, A Survey of Feminist Juris-
prudence, 16 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 183 (1994) (examining various approaches to
feminist jurisprudence); Denise G. Reaume, What's Distinctive About Feminist Analysis
of Law, 2 LEGAL THEORY 265 (1996) (discussing a new approach to feminist legal
analysis). Women's studies courses have proliferated in most disciplines in universi-
ties across the United States and across the globe. Cf. A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE IN THE
ACADEMY: THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES (Elizabeth Langland & Walter Gove eds., 1981)
(discussing whether women's studies, which have brought a feminist perspective to
the academy, actually have made any difference); BELL HOOKS, TEACHING TO
TRANSGRESS (1994) (considering how teachers may use education as a tool for liberation).
For a stinging critique of women's studies programs, see CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS,
WHO STOLE FEMINISM: How WOMEN HAVE BETRAYED WOMEN (1994). Women are
lobbying in huge numbers to have female politicians elected to political office.
WOMEN TRANSFORMING POLITICS 203, 204 (Jill M. Bystydzienski ed., 1992); see also
Susan J. Carroll, The Politics of Difference: Women Public Officials as Agents of Change, 5
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 11 (1994) (discussing the role of women both as voters and as
public officials).
35. See, e.g., Annie Bunting, Theorizing Women's Cultural Diversity in Feminist
International Human Rights Strategies, 20 J. L. & SOc'Y 6 (1993) (exploring how inter-
national human rights strategies can be more responsive to the needs of women in
diverse cultural settings); see also Cook, supra note 8, at 228 (arguing that states must
eliminate human rights violations against women).
36. Consider, for example, the campaign against female genital mutilation in
which Alice Walker, author of such popular works as The Color Purple and In Search
of Our Mother's Gardens, played a prominent role. For an extensive discussion of this
campaign and associated issues, see Isabelle Gunning, Female Genital Surgeries and
Multicultural Feminism: The Ties That Bind, the Differences That Distance, in THIRD
WORLD LEGAL STUDIES: WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND TRADITIONAL LAw: A CONFLICT? 17
(Penelope E. Andrews ed., 1994-95). Gunning accuses certain Western feminists of
not being sensitive to the perspectives of women of "other" cultures. Id. at 19-29; see
also Maivan Clech Lam, Feeling Foreign in Feminism, 19 SIGNS 865 (1994) (criticizing
the dominant form of feminism with respect to its treatment of non-White cultures).
37. Gunning, supra note 36, at 19-29; see also Thandabantu Nhlapo, Women's
Rights and the Family in Traditional and Customary Law, in PUTTING WOMEN ON THE
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observer, these practices represent the body of laws, practices, and
procedures that have maintained the culture of entire communities
for centuries." In short, the focus on discarding these practices
means losing the totality of what constitutes a particular commu-
nity's traditions and laws, ignoring the complexities of their
interaction with the community and the nuances of an individual's
engagement with these practices.39
In 1990, when delegates to South Africa's constitutional
negotiations fought over details of the rights to be included in
the new Constitution, women activists within South Africa had
already managed to organize and successfully influence the proc-
ess. They armed themselves with evidence of the importance of
formalizing protection for women. They were also sensitive to
the complex arguments over human rights and moral relativism
that ensue when an attempt is made to incorporate gender equality
into a system of constitutional law that retains, respect for traditional
law.
AGENDA 111 (Susan Bazilli ed., 1991) (considering the conflicts between traditional
South African family norms and women's equality).
38. I intend to defend neither polygamy nor the practice of female genital sur-
gery. With respect to polygamy, it has been ascertained that hostility to the practice is
widespread in South Africa. See Beauty Mkhize, Rural Women's Movement-the
Position of Rural Women, in CUSTOM AND RELIGION IN A NON-RACIAL NoN-SEXIST
SOUTH AFRIcA 10 (Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape ed.,
1993). Substantial evidence suggests that female genital surgery causes severe physi-
cal and psychological harm to young girls. See Robyn Cerny Smith, Female
Circumcision: Bringing Women's Perspectives into the International Debate, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2449 (1992); see also DPI-Release, Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities Addresses Harmful Traditional Practices Affecting Health of
Women and Girls, The Human Rights Information Network, HR/SC/97/14.
39. For example, this point is made forcefully with respect to sati (bride
burning):
A woman burns to death in a village in the state of Rajasthan
in India. The news makes it to the front page of the New York Times-
as had some years earlier the news that a woman had been stoned to
death for adultery in a Middle East country. The "monolithic 'Third
World Woman'" as subject instantaneously becomes an overdeter-
mined symbol, victim not only of universal patriarchy but also of
specific third world religious fundamentalism.
The stereotypical and merely sensational aspects of these'events,' isolated from their context, have tended to overwhelm not
only the much greater complexity of the issues actually involved, but
the equally significant protest mounted by local women's groups and
other sections of the population ....
RAJESWARI SUNDER RAJAN, REAL AND IMAGINED WOMEN 15 (1993) (footnotes omit-
ted); see also L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics, and
Intransigence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275
(1997) (arguing that imperatives of culture must be taken seriously when evaluating
practices such as female circumcision).
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II. THE POST-COLONIAL CONUNDRUM: CUSTOMARY
LAW AND DEMOCRACY
The cultures and traditions of non-Western peoples have always
invited scrutiny. This proved true for non-Western peoples under colo-
nial rule and equally true when they were the beneficiaries of
developmental assistance." During the colonial period, the pejora-
tive notion of the "other" justified the various values and practices of
colonialism.4' Modern day developmental assistance is often 9 redi-
cated on whether recipient countries meet "acceptable" norms.
The period of decolonization was accompanied by a rush of
Western lawyers and legal scholars who supported the goals of lib-
eration, and who were inspired by a desire to assist lawmakers and
lawyers in these newly independent states in the implementation of
modern laws consistent with democracy.4 These Western lawyers
displayed an unquestioning support of, and remarkable enthusiasm
for, the legal, political, and social transformations upon which those
societies were embarking.
One particularly significant group consisted of what became
known as law and development scholars." In an article alluding to
40. See generally ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 108-17
(1978) (examining how the law functions in Third World countries).
41. See, e.g., HENRY REYNOLDS, THE LAW OF THE LAND (1996) (discussing the legal
and political arguments used to justify the European settlement of Australia).
42. David Weisbrot, Restricting Foreign Aid on Human Rights Grounds, in IN-
TERNATIONAuZING HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW:
DOMESTIC ISSUES AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 30, 31 (David A. Johnson ed., 1981)
(analyzing restrictions on trade and aid based on violations of human rights by
recipient nations).
43. For an interesting discussion on law and lawmaking in newly independent
states, see Jean G. Zorn, Lawyers, Anthropologists, and the Study of Law: Encounters in
the New Guinea Highlands, 15 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 271 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT J.
GORDON & MERVYN J. MEGGIT, LAw AND ORDER IN THE NEW GUINEA H-IGHLANDS:
ENCOUNTERS WITH ENGA (1985)). Of course, Western lawyers were not the only
culprits. The Cold War ensured that Marxist lawyers from their respective societies
also attempted to place an imprimatur on laws in countries that were clearly com-
mitted to socialism. See Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping,
Gourding, & Serving Palm Wine, CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 167, 189 (1997).
44. See, e.g., Robert B. Seidman, Law and Development: A General Model, 6 L. &
SOC'Y REV. 311 (1972) (arguing for a general model relating law and social change).
For a critique of the law and development movement, refer to David Trubek & Mark
Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis of Law and Devel-
opment Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062. See also John Henry
Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Changes: On the Origins, Style, Decline and
Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COM. L. 457 (1977) (arguing
that "comparative law and social change" serves a better purpose than the law and
development movement).
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the role of the law and development scholars in the developing
world, Jean Zorn comments that
they viewed the introduction of Western law into the
Third World as a modernizing and beneficent act. To these
American lawyers, impelled by a terrible innocence not
only of the Third World, but of their own society as
well,. . . Western law .. .would promote individual
freedom, expand citizens' participation in government
and in the shaping of their own lives, and enhance so-
cial equality.5
This attitude coincided with what became a pattern in the
postcolonial state, namely, that traditional law was fated to succumb
to either modernization and incorporation into the national legal
framework or to relegation to second-rate status in a dual legal
framework." For newly independent governments, the cultural tra-
ditions of local communities, whether codified or not, often proved
too sensitive to deal with consistently. 47 Commissions of inquiry
were appointed to investigate particular institutions or practices of
traditional law and to make recommendations to the legislature. 4"
The presence of traditional law is not any easier for governments to
handle today. Certain cultural traditions remain highly contested
45. Zorn, supra note 43, at 285-86 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
46. See generally MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM AND SOCIAL ORDER (1985)
(examining the historical formation of African customary law).
47. This point has been made in relation to indigenous property rights in
Namibia. See Sidney L. Harring, The Constitution of Namibia and the 'Rights and Free-
doms' Guaranteed Communal Land Holders: Resolving the Inconsistency Between Article
16, Article 100, and Schedule 5, 12 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 467 (1996).
48. For example, after independence in Kenya, the government confronted the
issue of polygamy by setting up a commission of inquiry to make recommendations.
Even after deliberations, the Commission recommended that outlawing polygamy
would not prove beneficial but that changes in lifestyles, particularly for women,
would ensure that the practice ended. See J.B. Ojwang, Polygamy as a Legal and Social
Institution in Kenya, 10 E. APR. L.J. 63, 74. After independence, the government of
Ghana "attempt[ed] a reform of the customary marriage system. The [then-ruling]
Convention People's Party programme of 1962 affirm[ed] adherence to the principle
of complete sex equality and declare[d] that social changes ha[d] made polygamy
inappropriate." H.J. SIMONS, AFRICAN WOMEN 85 (1968). In Zimbabwe, the govern-
ment promulgated the Legal Age of Majority Act, Act No. 15 of 1982, after
independence. The Act enabled a woman over the age of 18 to contract a marriage
without her (former) guardian's consent and without a lobolo agreement. Lobolo
describes a man's obligation to pay cattle, horses, hoes, money, or other property to
the father of his intended bride or wife in consideration of their marriage. See T.W.
BENNET-r, A SOURCEBOOK OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA 195
(1991). For a discussion of these changes in Zimbabwe, see Welshman Ncube,
Released from Legal Minority: The Legal Age of Majority Act in Zimbabwe, in WOMEN
AND LAW IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 193 (Alice Armstrong ed., 1987).
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and complex, and scrutinizing them can engender highly emotional
debates.
Despite the increased urbanization of South Africa, significant
proportions of the African population still have aspects of their lives
governed by customary law.49 In fact, it has been suggested that
traditional authorities are, in effect, the bridge from the pre-
colonialist Africanist past to contemporary South Africa. ° The new
democratic South Africa confronts the perennial challenge of all
post-colonial governments incorporating the remnants of indigenous
laws, institutions, and policies with the modern constitutional order.
Women activists in South Africa therefore recognized that, while
traditional law retained many patriarchal or sexist features, they
wanted and needed to be able to discard these features without
discarding all of customary law.
Ell. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS
The entry onto the international human rights stage of
women's rights activists and feminist scholars coincided with an-
other significant inroad into human rights discourse and practice:
the emergence of demands by indigenous peoples around the
globe for recognition of their cultural and other derivative rights."'
In light of the historical denigration and marginalization of in-
digenous law and custom, the rekindling of the rights of
indigenous peoples internationally resonated strongly in South
Africa." A combination of the post-colonial repackaged versions of
Africanism and Black Power created the possibility of the conflu-
ence of "Africanization" with the "national question."53 An
unintended consequence of the confluence of these developments was
the emergence of a conflict between certain aspects of indigenous
49. A point worth noting is that Muslims in South Africa are also governed by a
form of customary law, which shares some similarity with African customary law,
particularly in relation to aspects of family law. Islamic customary law is not dis-
cussed in this Article because of significant historical and experiential differences
between Muslim and African people, which are sufficiently great to require a sepa-
rate analysis. For an analysis of Islamic law in South Africa, see FIROZ CACHALIA,
THE FUTURE OF MUSLIM LAw IN SOUTH AFRICA (1991).
50. See Yvonne Mokgoro, Traditional Authority and Democracy in the Interim South
African Constitution, 3 REV. CONST. STUD. 60 (1996).
51. Maivan Clech Lam, Making Room for Peoples at the United Nations: Thoughts
Provoked by Indigenous Claims to Self-Determination, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 603, 607
(1992).
52. See Christina Murray & Felicity Kaganis, Equality and Culture in South Africa's
Interim Constitution, 5 OXFORD INT'L L. REv. 17 (1994).
53. Frances Meli, South Africa and the Rise of African Nationalism, in THE NA-
TIONAL QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRIcA 66, 67-76 (Maria Van Diepen ed., 1988).
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custom and the expanded consensus (albeit a fragile one) on
women's equality. This conflict created the paradigm whereby
those with vested interests in maintaining a traditional legal order
were pitted against feminist activists. 4 The ensuing debate be-
tween feminists and traditionalists has incorporated the hackneyed
discussion of cultural relativism versus universalism5 and the
emerging post-colonial discourse that incorporates the post-
modern imperative of multiple truths.-6 In short, all these theoreti-
cal traditions have influenced the tone and substance of the
debates.
The issues are particularly trying in light of the post-colonial
aspiration to dislodge Western political hegemony while simultane-
ously accommodating the new world order of human rights.57 This
struggle is mirrored in the South African context, where the issue of
the role of traditional law emerges from a legacy of marginalization
and denigration. 8 The colonial and apartheid legal order perpetu-
ated an inferior role and status for traditional law within the
national legal framework. Interaction and the resultant exchange of
ideas and approaches between the two systems and their under-
lying values were almost non-existent.59 Moreover, African laws
54. See L. Amede Obiora, New Skin, Old Wine: (En)gaging Nationalism, Tradition-
alism, and Gender Relations, 28 IND. L. REV. 575, 590-92 (1995) (discussing the conflict
between traditionalist and non-traditionalist women over alimony).
55. See generally JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (1989) (discussing the necessity of approaching human rights issues
without regard to conventional disciplinary boundaries); Jack Donnelly, Cultural
Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400 (1984) (arguing that
there should be a fundamental universality of basic human rights, tempered by a
recognition of the possible need for limited cultural variations); Tracy E. Higgins,
Anti-Essentialism, Relativism and Human Rights, 19 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 89 (1996)
(exploring the culture-specific reasons for holding back the goals of feminists and
the way in which feminists should respond).
56. See Mridula Udayagiri, Challenging Modernization: Gender and Development,
Postmodern Feminism and Activism, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM DEVELOPMENT 159
(Marianne H. Marchand & Jane L. Parpart eds., 1995) (critiquing the use of textual
analysis as the primary theoretical strategy); see also RAJAN, supra note 39, at 10-13
(considering how to "unfix" subjects without embracing moral relativism).
57. See Weisbrot, supra note 42 (analyzing the tying of aid to an acceptable hu-
man rights record).
58. See Martin Chanock, The South African Native Administration Act of 1927:
Reflections on a Pathological Case of Legal Pluralism, in THE RIGHTS OF SUBORDINATED
PEOPLES 295 (Oliver Mendelsohn & Upendra Baxi eds., 1994).
59. Ismail Mahomed, The Future of Roman-Dutch Law in Southern Africa, Particu-
larly in Lesotho, 1 LESOTHO L.J. 357, 361 (1985).
Roman-Dutch law and customary law evolved virtually as parallel
systems .... The Roman-Dutch system interacted and cross-
pollinated with English law to create in effect a new system of South
African common law. But in Lesotho and certain other parts of
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and customs, when accorded authority through the Bantustan
structure and the system of chiefs, actually served a useful purpose
in administering apartheid. Traditional chiefs were frequently the
apartheid government's surrogate administrators in the so-called
homelandsW In the urbanized context of the liberation struggle in
South Africa, certain traditional institutions became synonymous
with apartheid rule in the Bantustans." In the mind of the urban elites of
the liberation movement, the crisis of legitimacy for the apartheid legal
configuration affected its Bantustan apparatus of chiefs.u Consequently,
Southern Africa, the Roman-Dutch law remained substantially im-
mune from the influence of African customary law.
Id.
60. The legal instrument that solidified this control was the Black Administration
Act No. 38 of 1927 (also known as the Native Administration Act). Through the
passage of this Act, the South African government imposed upon the African popu-
lation a national system of "recognition" of African law. Under this system, "[t]he
governor-general [of the Union of South Africa] was made the supreme chief of all
Africans, and [was empowered to] appoint and depose chiefs, divide or amalgamate
tribes, deport and banish tribal groups or individuals, and legislate by decree for the
scheduled native areas." SIMONS, supra note 48, at 53. A separate system of courts
uniformly recognized and administered tribal law. These courts were comprised of
"chiefs', native commissioners', native appeal[,] and native divorce courts." Id. They
had discretion to apply tribal law in actions between Africans arising out of "African
custom;' unless the custom was repugnant to natural justice or public policy, or
conflicted with any statutory provision. See id. at 53-55.
61. See generally SIMONS, supra note 48, at 42-43 (discussing strategic South
African governmental acceptance of African customs that benefited rule by Whites).
The Bantustans, or "homelands;' were part of the grand scheme of apartheid; it was
to be the place where ostensibly African people would exercise political rights
(thereby denying such rights in South Africa). It was an integral part of the migrant
labor system; the Bantustans in effect served the purpose of housing South Africa's"surplus population" (women, children, and unemployed men). BARBARA ROGERS,
DIVIDE AND RULE (1976); see also HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE HOMELANDS: SOUTH
AFRICA'S DELEGATION OF REPRESSION (Fund for Free Expression ed., 1984). See gener-
ally INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE & AID FUND FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA, APARTHEID: THE
FACTS (1983) (discussing the use of Bantustans to segregate persons on account of
race).
62. It is significant that, at the local level, the chiefs are a form of local govern-
ment, dispensing certain goods and services. See Mokgoro, supra note 50, at 66. Their
functions include:
" The allocation of land held in trust for small-scale farming, graz-
ing and residential purposes (not for commercialism);
" The preservation of law and order, including adjudication over
minor disputes of a civil nature;
" The provision and administration of services at a local govern-
ment level;
" Social welfare administration within their communities, including
the processing of applications for social security benefits and
business premises; and
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the association of certain indigenous structures with the administration
of South Africa limited their broader appeal within the country. The
link between traditional African leadership and apartheid did not
prevent the role of the traditional leadership from receiving weighty
consideration in the deliberations preceding the constitutional nego-
tiations.6 A leading ANC lawyer, and now constitutional court
judge, made the point clearly:
Traditional leaders [in a new South Africa] are entitled
to a dignified and respected role which enables them to
take their place in and make their contribution towards
building a new [society]. Their position in the new con-
stitutional order should be such as to permit them to
recapture the prestige which was undermined by colo-
nialism, segregation and apartheid."
At the constitutional negotiations, traditional leaders lobbied
extensively to place customary law outside the purview of the Con-
stitution or legislative enactments that mandate equality.6 First, they
viewed traditional law as deserving a new parallel status with the
national legal system." Second, they maintained that traditional
laws and institutions were sufficientlY democratic so as not to re-
quire change by the new Constitution. Third, they wanted to ensure
Promotion of education, including the erection and maintenance
of schools and the administration of access to education, finance,
for example, scholarship and study loans to scholars and students.
Id. Customary law largely provided the framework for personal laws, particularly
family law, in the Bantustans. T.W. BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND AFRICAN
CUSTOMARY LAW 66 (1995).
63. See, e.g., African National Congress, Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic
South Africa, 5 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 129, 130 (1989) ("The institution of hereditary
rulers and chiefs shall be transformed to serve the interests of the people as a whole
in conformity with the democratic principles embodied in the constitution.").
64. SACHS, supra note 2, at 77.
65. See Mokgoro, supra note 50, at 70.
66. lain Currie, The Future of Customary Law: Lessons from the Lobolo Debate, in
GENDER AND THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 146, 149 ("The
essence of their proposal ... was that customary law and general South African law
should be parallel legal systems, neither empowered to interfere with the other.").
67. Their argument was based not so much on democracy but on a sense of the
community's loyalty to things traditional. See Mokgoro, supra note 50, at 68.
The [traditional] system itself, despite its flaws and the contro-
versy around it, is firmly in place and is cherished by rural communities.
They identify with it and see it as their own. Whether it is appreciated or
not, [traditional authorities] do exercise substantial power and authority,
including that of a political nature, over their rural communities.
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a level of autonomy for traditional institutions in order to maintain
the status quo, in which power was vested in the chiefs, who were
all older males.'
For two discrete and important constituencies in South Africa,
women and African traditionalists, the new constitutional order
provided the opportunity for past legal exclusions to be corrected.
Women lobbied extensively for a constitutional commitment to gen-
der equality. African traditionalists lobbied for the constitutional
protection of indigenous customs and laws.6 Both groups secured
certain constitutional guarantees, as outlined in the following sec-
tion.0
IV. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT
Once women's issues were incorporated into the post-
apartheid political and legal agenda, women could utilize their
political skills developed in the decades of struggle against apart-
heid to place their mark on the new constitutional arrangement.7
In the decades preceding the seismic changes that reshaped the
nation, South African women had been involved in major debates
about the shape and content of constitutional protections of
women's rights in various international forums. Women's organi-
zations, academics, female members of the major political parties,
68. Their rationale appears to be replete with contradictions. Although persua-
sive arguments can be raised about parallel systems and autonomy, the exclusion of
women and younger men from positions of leadership in traditional communities
raises questions about the inherent democracy of these institutions. See Khanya B.
Motshabi & Shereen G. Volks, Towards Democratic Chieftaincy: Principles and Proce-
dures, 1991 ACrA JURIDICA 104 (examining the institution of chieftancy and
suggesting ways in which it may be made more democratic). Referring to the Bill of
Rights during the constitutional negotiations, an irate Chief Nonkonyana, in a highly
publicized newspaper interview stated, "[m]y son can be successfully challenged for
my throne by my daughter, because the Bill says that all forms of discrimination-
and it is emphatic on gender--should not be permitted." BENNETt, supra note 62, at
21.
69. As Martin Chanock has pointed out, "debates about the customary law tend
to begin with cultural celebration of its special characteristics and develop into
skepticism about its equity." Martin Chanock, Law, State and Culture: Thinking About
'Customary Law' After Apartheid, 1991 ACrA JURIDICA 52, 63.
70. Similar questions are related to the laws and customs of other communities,
such as Islamic and Jewish ones. Mavivi Manzini, a female South African parlia-
mentarian, has challenged the "special status" of African communities with respect
to these issues, concluding that all religious and ethnic minority traditions were
marginalized by the system of Roman-Dutch law that dominated in South Africa. See
Mavivi Manzini, Remarks at the Michigan Journal of Race & Law Symposium,
"Constitution-Making in South Africa" 366 (Mar. 22,1997) (transcript on file with the
Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
71. See Albertyn, supra note 1, at 51-54.
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and women's trade union groups lobbied hard for the incorpora-
tion of gender equality into the transitional Constitution.2 Both the
transitional Constitution and the final version are evidence of the
successes of these lobbying efforts.73
Women presented their demands in a charter of women's
rights, which embodied the priorities of women throughout the
country.74 These demands included contractual, property, and
inheritance rights that had been denied to women under both the
South African legal system and African customary law.75 The
women identified the right to participate in traditional and com-
munity courts as essential 76 and they called for active participation
in all traditional institutions." Women demanded the discontinua-
tion of laws that failed to recognize the legality of customary
marriages, calling for recognition equal to that given to other legal
forms of marriage.78 Although the Charter articulates the freedom
of women to "practice their own religion, culture or beliefs without
fear," 79 it states unequivocally that "custom, culture and religion
shall be subject to the equality clause of the Bill of Rights."''
72. Murray & Kaganis, supra note 52.
73. The principle of gender equality is enshrined in both the transitional and
final Constitution in the Bill of Rights. S. AFR. CONST. §§ 7-39; S. AFR. CONST. §§ 7-35
(1993).
74. WOMEN'S CHARTER FOR EFFECrIvE EQUALITY (1994) [hereinafter CHARTER].
The preamble to the Charter states that "[wie set out here a programme for equality
in all spheres of our lives, including the law, the economy, education, development
and infrastructure, political and civic life, family life and partnerships, custom,
culture and religion, health and the media." Id. at 1.
75. Article 2 of the Charter states that "[w]omen shall have equal legal status and
capacity in civil law, including amongst others, full contractual rights, the right to
acquire and hold rights in property, the right to equal inheritance and the right to
secure credit." Id. at 2. Article 5 of the Charter provides that "[w]omen must have
equal access to land and security of tenure, including women living under customary
law." Id. at 6. Article 8 of the Charter provides that "[wiomen married under custom-
ary law shall have the right to inherit from their husbands." Id. at 7.
76. Article 2 of the Charter provides that "[wiomen shall have equal representa-
tion on, and participation in, all traditional courts, alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms and local community courts." Id. at 3. Similarly, Article 7 states that
"[riural women have the right to be part of decision-making structures in traditional
communities." Id. at 7.
77. Article 7 of the Charter provides that "[tiraditional institutions shall be
restructured in accordance with the principles of equality and democracy." Id. at 7.
78. CHARTER, supra note 74, Art. 8. In South Africa only civil marriages are
recognized by law; customary marriages do not have legal status because they are
seen as potentially polygamous. A customary marriage can be converted into a civil
marriage, however. See MURIEL HORREL, THE RIGHTS OF AFRICAN WOMEN 7-9 (1968).
Legal recognition is denied to Muslim marriages as well. See Kader v. Kader, 1972 (3)
SA 203 (A).
79. CHARTER, supra note 74, Art. 9 at 8.
80. Id.
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Moreover, Article 9 of the Charter, entitled "Custom, Culture and
Religion," is introduced in rather strong. terms: "Customary, cul-
tural and religious practice frequently subordinate women. Roles
that are defined for women are both stereotypical and restrictive.
Women are often excluded from full participation, leadership and
decision-making in religious and cultural practice."'"
The formal commitment to the democratic ideals of non-
racialism and gender equality as embodied in the Constitution
raises questions about customary law and certain customary insti-
tutions that discriminate against women.82 Criticism has been
81. Id. The foregoing comments have mainly focused on those sections of the
Charter dealing with traditional law, policy and practice. The Charter, however,
comprehensively deals with the overall spectrum of women's lives. Id. The signifi-
cance of the Charter and the political lobbying preceding it, was the
comprehensiveness of the document and its representation of solid grass-roots
organizing and political coalitions among women from different constituencies.
These developments indicate that a South African "feminism" may emerge that not
only recognizes the intersection of race, class, and geographic location, but that may
avoid the elitism of Western feminism. See Jacklyn Cock, Putting Women on the
Agenda, in PurITNG WOMEN ON THE AGENDA, supra note 37, at 27 (exploring the
problems involved with working to get women's concerns heard); see also Jo Beall et
al., 'A Bit on the Side?': Gender Struggles in the Politics of Transformation in South Africa,
33 FEMINIST REV. 30, 32 (1989) (critiquing the "women question position' a position
"broadly based on the classical socialist position on women's oppression, namely
that women's oppression will be eliminated in the course of transition to socialism,"
and offering "as an alternative, a socialist-feminist position which sees women's
struggles as a legitimate and integral part of a broader struggle, which transform not
only the form and content of those struggles, but also the type of development policy
which flows from them").
82. In the area of family law, Thandabantu Nhlapo has identified as clearly
discriminatory institutions such as lobolo, polygamy, child betrothal (whereby young
girls are promised as brides, often to older men), the levirate (when a man dies, and
his male relative fathers children on his behalf with the decedent's wife), and the
sororate (when a younger sister must replace a wife who is unable to produce chil-
dren). See T.R. Nhlapo, The African Family and Women's Rights: Friends or Foes, 1991
ACTAJURIDICA 135. But Nhlapo has also warned against simplistic tabulation of these
institutions and practices. Instead, he has suggested a comprehensive analysis that
places them within the socioeconomic, political, and cultural context of community
and family relations. One must deconstruct their significance within those parame-
ters. For example, with respect to marriage in traditional African society, Nhlapo
highlights that the group as a whole, and not only the husband and wife, has a stake.
Thandabantu Nhlapo, African Customary Law in the Interim Constitution, in THE
CONSTrnMON OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM A GENDER PERSPECriVE, supra note 11, at 157.
He argues further that
there is another aspect to this favouring of group interests over those
of the individuals involved: in patriarchal societies group interests
are framed in favour of men.
Here is the first indication of why inequality is such an en-
during part of African customary systems. The field of family
relations is one in which Africans construct the foundations of their
social lives. If that system masks inequality under the guise of group
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directed at the constitutional protections of traditional authorities
in light of their apparent contradiction of the democratic ideals
underpinning the new legal order. The contradictions surface in
relation to three characteristics of customary institutions: the first
two intrinsic to these institutions, the last is an extraneous factor.
The first is the hierarchical and patriarchal nature of the traditional
institutions. According to African law, succession to the office of
chief is hereditary.4 This is linked to the second characteristic, that
hereditary rules mandate that only male heirs can become chiefs.,
Both of these limitations clearly vitiate accepted notions of democracy.
Hereditary succession with respect to community leadership contra-
dicts the principle of elected government. In addition, excluding
women from holding office clearly violates the constitutional man-
date of gender equality.6 The third characteristic of African
customary law in which these contradictions surface is the ma-
nipulation of its institutions by successive colonial and apartheid
governments. 7 The manipulation and distortion of customary
law and its institutions, as opposed to its marginalization or de-
struction, faces less of a challenge. The political process of
Africanization in South Africa, which is an imperative of the new
order, will entail both a modification and reinvigoration of tradi-
tional law.M
Although this debate is conducted in the cultural arena, its
concerns are fundamentally economic. In other words, the struggle
interests, women and children, lacking a say in the articulation of
those interests, are certain to be disadvantaged.
Id. at 160.
83. Motshabi & Volks, supra note 68, at 111 (discussing the patriarchal basis of
traditional chieftaincy).
84. BENNETT, supra note 48.
85. J.C. BEKKER, SEYMOUR'S CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUrHERN AFRICA 273 (1989).
Motshabi and Volks have pointed out that, except for one community in the North-
ern Transvaal, women are precluded from becoming chiefs. Motshabi & Volks, supra
note 68, at 104-05.
86. See S. AFR. CONSr. §§ 7-30.
87. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
88. See Mokgoro, supra note 50, at 67. Mokgoro points out that
[t]he call for enhanced and maximized power for traditional leader-
ship, despite the system's notorious history, seemed to form part of
the justification in the arguments that colonialism, apartheid and
racism in South Africa had made Africanism an integral part of
the history of the national liberation struggle. Achieving national
liberation should therefore include the restoration and revival of
institutions symbolic of African pride, dignity and other forms of
assertion.
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is not only over cultural rights, but also over the economic rights
that traditional laws may thwart. To state the obvious: an economic
loss occurs when African women are denied the right to own prop-
erty, inherit, or be recognized as heads of households.89 Therefore
traditional laws that disadvantage women contribute to the cycle of
poverty and despair that plague a large proportion of Black women in
South Africa.90 In addition, the patriarchal basis of traditional authori-
ties excludes women from becoming engaged in activities at the local
government level and making decisions that will have a profound
effect, not only on their own lives, but on their communities as a
whole.9'
V. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION
A. The Constitution and Gender Equality
References to the ideals of non-sexism are scattered through-
out the South African Constitution. In the Founding Provisions,92 the
values that underpin the democratic state, including non-racialism
89. I refer here to traditional laws that deny women these rights. See Chanock,
supra note 58. Referring to lobolo, Chanock elaborates: "The entrenchment of bride-
wealth payments as a fundamental legal necessity for marriage, and as a major
transfer of... resources, has been arguably the most crucial feature of African
private law in South Africa. It is the lynchpin of the legal subordination of African
women in private law." Id. at 317-18. Similarly, the KwaZulu Code in Natal pro-
vided that women could not become heads of households and accordingly could
not own or control property. KwaZulu Government Notice 47 (1982); KwaZulu Act on
the Code of Zulu Law (1981), cited in Penelope Andrews, Spectators at the Revolution?
Gender Equality and Customary Law in a Post-Apartheid South Africa, in 7 LAW &
ANTHROPOLOGY: INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK FOR LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY (Ren6
Kuppe & Richard Potz eds., 1994).
90. However, one commentator has argued that certain traditional practices
provide a social welfare net for women. See C.R.M. Dlamini, The Role of Customary
Law in Meeting Social Needs, in 1991 AcTA JURIDICA 71. Referring specifically to
polygamy (the practice whereby a man could marry as many wives as he could
afford), Dlamini argues that "[i]n traditional society, where there were few job
opportunities for women, polygamy enabled women to marry and to have children;
marriage provided security." Id. at 77.
91. Yvorne Mokgoro makes the point persuasively:
[T]he undemocratic aspects of traditional authority serving as local
structures cannot be ignored. They have outlived their acceptability
and are offensive to the principles of participatory development and
government accountability. Because of this weakness, many rural
communities have become the pariah of South African society.
Meaningful development in rural areas is therefore imperative.
Mokgoro, supra note 50, at 68.
92. Id. §§ 1-6.
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and non-sexism, are listed.93 The most significant provisions relating
to gender equality are found in the Bill of Rights, particularly the
section on equality." This section contains a general commitment
to equality before the law and equal protection of the law,9 and
states that "[tihe state may not unfairly discriminate directly or
indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race,
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin,
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience,
belief, culture, language and birth."96 Not all of these rights,
however, are non-derogable.9 Derogation from the constitutional
protection of equality is not allowed with respect to "unfair dis-
crimination solely on the grounds of race, colour, ethnic or social
origin, sex, religion, or language."98
The prohibition on direct and indirect discrimination
implicitly acknowledges the invidiousness and tenacity of insti-
tutionalized discrimination." This acknowledgment reflects the
dominant jurisprudential trends in liberal democracies where the
principle of equality has been trumpeted in constitutional and
legislative packages. °° The inclusion of both sex and gender as
grounds for proscribing discrimination protects women from invidi-
ous discrimination based on both biological and physical attributes,
as well as social and cultural stereotypes about the perceived role
and status of women.'0 '
93. Id. § 1(b).
94. Id. §9.
95. Id. § 9(1).
96. Id.§9(3).
97. Id. § 37(5).
98. Id. The exclusion of sex, and not gender, as a non-derogable category reflects
a certain reticence on the part of the constitutional drafters to upset prevailing
stereotypes about the role and status of women. However, the South African
drafters were bolder than the American courts that subject sexual discrimination
to intermediate scrutiny and racial discrimination to strict scrutiny.
99. See generally MARGARET THORNTON, THE LIBERAL PROMISE (1990) (discussing
anti-discrimination legislation in Australia).
100. See Diana Majury, Strategizing in Equality, 3 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 169 (1987).
"Equality is, at present, too much a part of the dominant legal discourse in Canada to
be ignored." Id. at 174. Majury believes that the focus should be on inequality, rather
than equality. Id. at 172. She proposes an "inequality-based strategy." Id. Of course,
the principle of equality is a contested one. Feminists have advocated for an inter-
pretation of equality theory that recognizes the real experiences of women; they do
not want one that is abstract and formal and that does not address structural
inequality. Id. at 180 ("As abstract constructs, [existing equality] models do not and
cannot address the realities of women's lives:'); see also Kathleen A. Lahey, Feminist
Theories of (In)Equality, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 5 (1987) (considering the definitions of
equality under the laws of Canada, the United States, and Wisconsin).
101. Majury, supra note 101 at 173-76. Majury stresses, however, that in the ensu-
ing debate over the meaning of equality, women must be vocal and active. She
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The inclusion of protective measures or affirmative action is of
potentially great value to women. The relevant constitutional provi-
sion reads: "To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and
other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories
of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken."'"°
It has become clear that a constitutional mandate for affirmative
action is an important weapon for tackling structural discrimination
in a comprehensive manner, as well as shielding affirmative action
programs from constitutional challenge9 0 The policy of affirmative
action has been enshrined in international human rights instru-
ments, most notably in CEDAW, which provides that "[a]doption by
State Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de
facto equality between men and women shall not be considered
discriminatory .... These measures shall be discontinued when the
objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been
achieved."',1°
The goals of non-sexism are promoted in other sections in the
Bill of Rights. Section 12 provides that "[elveryone has the right to
bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right (a) to
make decisions concerning reproduction; (b) to security in and con-
trol over their body; and (c) not to be subjected to medical or
scientific experiments without their informed consent."'10 All of these
provisions have the enormous potential of protecting women with
regard to personal choices about birth control and reproduction. In a
clause that has potentially profound consequence for victims of do-
mestic and other forms of violence, the Bill of Rights provides that
all people have the right to freedom and security of their person,
which includes the right to be free from all forms of violence from
either public or private sources.1°6 The Constitution also protects free-
dom of expression only insofar as it does not involve "advocacy of
hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that
constitutes incitement to cause harm."107
believes that women must "operationalize equality" instead of simply "defining it
through legal analysis and theory making." Id. at 187.
102. S. AFR. CONST. § 9(2).
103. Penelope E. Andrews, Affirmative Action in South Africa: Some Theoretical and
Practical Issues, in THE CONSrrUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM A GENDER PERSPECrIVE,
supra note 11, at 49, 55. In this article I focused on affirmative action as one way of
overcoming the historical impediments facing the majority of women. Id. at 49.
104. CEDAW, supra note 12, at 3.
105. S. AFR. CONsT. § 12(1)(c).
106. Id. § 16(1).
107. Id. § 16(2)(c). The Constitution also does not extend the right to the freedom
of expression to "propaganda for war [or] incitement of imminent violence." Id.
§ 16(2)(b)-(c).
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An innovative provision in the Constitution is the establishment
of a Commission for Gender Equality empowered to promote,
educate, monitor, and lobby for gender equality.' The Constitution
also provides for a Human Rights Commission to promote and pro-
tect human rights.'9 The constitutional provision of these two
commissions has engendered some passionate debate in South
Africa. Supporters of a separate structure, such as the Commission
for Gender Equality, opine that only such a body can deal compre-
hensively with women's issues and develop the capacity to build
and enhance a solid culture committed to eradicating sexism. They
fear that the incorporation of women's concerns under the general
rubric of human rights will marginalize and trivialize women's
issues, and that, consequently, the eradication of racism will take
priority."' Opponents of a separate body to administer only
women's issues argue that such a structure will inevitably serve to
ghettoize women's issues and that, in any event, for most Black
women, subordination stems from an interplay of racial, gender, and•• 112
economic questions. Opponents also argue that it is important for a
body like the Human Rights Commission to develop the means to
108. Section 187 provides for the following functions of the Commission for
Gender Equality:
(1) The Commission for Gender Equality must promote respect for
gender equality and the protection, development and attainment of
gender equality.
(2) The Commission for Gender Equality has the power, as regulated
by national legislation, necessary to perform its functions, including
the power to monitor, investigate, research, educate, lobby, advise
and report on issues concerning gender equality.
Id. § 187(1H2).
109. Id. § 184.
110. Catherine Albertyn, National Machinery for Ensuring Gender Equality, in THE
CONSTITION OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 17
("These councils can enhance the role of the executive structure in developing an
overall policy vision on gender and developing specific policies in accordance with
this vision .... Implementation and enforcement of rights and policy is as important
as formulation and planning."). Id. at 16-17.
111. Id. at 17. Some women have argued that it is important that the brief of the
Human Rights Commission includes women's needs and experiences. It is for this
reason that they oppose establishment of the Commission for Gender Equality,
believing that it will effectively exclude women's rights from the mainstream of
human rights which is the purview of the Human Rights Commission. Others argue
that, because of the specific needs of women, it is not only important to have a
separate Commission for Gender Equality, but that this commission should also
have the power to enforce women's human rights. See id.
112. Id.; see also Adrien Wing, Black South African Women: Towards Equal Rights, 8
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. (1995) (analyzing the struggle of Black women in South Africa to
overcome racism and sexism, focusing specifically on four areas: employment,
education, rape and domestic violence, and health care).
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cope with women's subordination so that the experiences and needs
of women can be incorporated into a comprehensive and effective
strategy to combat all kinds of discrimination, no matter where they
originate."'
Only the passage of time will vindicate either position. At
the time this Article was being written, only the Human Rights
Commission had been fully established and was functioning effec-
tively. The Gender Commissioners had been appointed, but the
Commission had not yet commenced operations. Several possible
explanations exist for this delay. First, the transformation of gov-
ernment in South Africa and the establishment of governmental
structures and systems congruent with post-apartheid democratic
ideals have been Herculean tasks. On the one hand, many govern-
ment ministers, senior bureaucrats, and policy makers had no
experience in operating within the paradigms of government. On
the other hand, senior bureaucrats who maintained their apart-
heid-period bureaucratic positions have been hostile to the goals of
transformation. Consequently, it has been impossible to set up the
appropriate human rights bodies expeditiously. 4 Second, the estab-
lishment of tribunals requires a resource commitment which the
new South African government must balance against other
needs. Arguably, these competing resource demands have made
the establishment of the Gender Commission a lower priority."'
Third, the establishment of the Human Rights Commission before
the Gender Commission reflects the eneral priority accorded racial
equality issues over women's rights, 1 as well as the continued dis-
tinction between "human rights" and "women's rights" despite
several decades of feminist criticism of this distinction." 7
113. These sentiments were raised in workshops and conversations at the Confer-
ence on Gender and Constitution, attended by the author, and held under the
auspices of the University of the Western Cape in Cape Town in January 1995. The
proceedings of the conference culminated in the publication of THE CONSTITrUTION OF
SOUTH AFRICA FROM A GENDER PERSPECrIVE, supra note 11.
114. See Albertyn, supra note 110, at 11.
115. Id.
116. In South Africa, there has been broad consensus about the need to eradicate
racism in all its forms and manifestations. No such universal consensus has existed
about the need to eradicate the many expressions and vagaries of sexism. See Julia
Segar & Caroline White, Constructing Gender: Discrimination and the Law in South
Africa, 4 AGENDA 95 (1989) (focusing on the role of law in maintaining the oppression
of South African women).
117. This point has been made powerfully in relation to domestic violence. See
Rhonda Copelon, Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN, supra note 8, at 116 (comparing domestic violence and torture, as they are
defined in international law); see also Charlotte Bunche, Women's Rights as Human
Rights: Towards a Re-Vision of Human Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 486 (1990) (analyzing the
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It can be argued that these obstacles have been overcome,
since the Gender Commissioners have been appointed. The obstacles
clearly, however, contain a warning: the Commission may have to
negotiate a difficult landscape in order to be effective in enforcing
women's rights. Moreover, the presence of these obstacles makes it
clear that in a society so resistant to removing long established
patriarchal institutions and sexist practices, implementing the
constitutional promises of gender equality will require tremendous
vigor and vigilance by women activists.
The Bill of Rights is fairly expansive, detailing who will be
entitled to legal standing and, arguably, laying the basis for class
action litigation. It creates a means of enforcing some of the above
mentioned rights. Relief may be sought by "(a) [alnyone acting in
[his or her] own interest; (b) anyone acting on behalf of another
person who cannot act in [his or her] own name; (c) any one person
acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of
persons; (d) any one person acting in the public interest; and (e) an
association acting in the interests of its members."'18 The constitu-
tional provisions promoting gender equality represent a major
victory for women, but including these protections in a bill of rights
is obviously only the first step in the road towards gender equality.
Women activists will need to be vigilant in implementing and
enforcing these protections 9
There is some indication that a national consensus about
gender equality will grow. In Hugo v. President of South Africa,"' the
Constitutional Court had occasion to rule on a prison inmate's con-
stitutional challenge to an executive order by President Mandela,
made under South Africa's interim Constitution, 2' which granted
special remission of sentences for certain categories of prisoners:i "
The prisoner challenged the category that applied only to "all moth-
ers ... with minor children. ' ' The respondent had a twelve-year-old
reasons for and policy implications of distinct visions of women's rights and human
rights).
118. S. AFR. CONST. § 38
119. The overall legal landscape for women appears positive. The government's
Reconstruction and Development Program, a five year plan of governance, reflects a
commitment to the principle of gender equality. See AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS,
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (1994).
120. 1996 (4) SA 1012 (CC).
121. S. AFR. CONST. (1993). This Constitution was replaced by the final
Constitution which forms the basis of this Article.
122. Correctional Services Amendment Act, No. 17 of 1994 (SA), construed in
Hugo v. President of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 1012 (CC). The act applied to people
who were under eighteen, all disabled people, and all mothers who were in prison
on May 10, 1994. Id. at 1013.
123. Id.
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child, and he claimed this provision violated sections 8(1) and (2) of
the interim Constitution in that it unfairly discriminated against him
on the basis of sex or gender. 4
The President's affidavit provided the rationale for the special
remission of mothers of minor children. He stated that he
was motivated predominantly by a concern for children
who had been deprived of the nurturing and care which
their mothers would ordinarily have provided.... I am
... aware that imprisonment inevitably has harsh con-
sequences for the family of the prisoner .... Account
was taken of the special role.., that mothers play in the
care and nurturing of young children...."
The Court found that even though the Act was premised on a
generalization that mothers are primarily responsible for the care of
small children, it did not amount to unfair discrimination. The Court
distinguished between the situation where women as a group are
deprived of benefits based on their child-rearing responsibilities'26
and the situation under consideration, where the presence of these
responsibilities meant that women were afforded an opportunity.
The Court considered the fact that men were not members of a dis-
advantaged group. Although the Court determined that this fact
alone was insufficient to find the discrimination fair, it saw the need
"to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognizes that
although a society which affords each human being equal treatment
on the basis of equal worth and freedom is our goal, we cannot
achieve that goal by insisting upon identical treatment in all circum-
stances before that goal is achieved." z7
The Court goes beyond the notion of formal equality, to one of
substantive equality.
B. The Constitution and Traditional Law
In contrast to the gender equality provisions in the Bill of
Rights and elsewhere in the Constitution, the Constitution is
remarkably abbreviated on the issue of traditional law. Chapter 12
124. The respondent argued that the Act, by releasing all mothers whose children
were under the age of 12, discriminated against fathers of children of the same
age. In fact, the discrimination was two-fold: only women who were parents (of
children under 12) were released; childless women were not. Section 8 in the
interim Constitution is similar to section 9 in the final Constitution.
125. Hugo v. President of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 1012, 1022 (CC).
126. Id. at 1023.
127. Id.
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provides for the recognition and role of traditional leaders.1" The
only provision in this chapter pertinent to the issues addressed in
this Article is the stipulation that "[tihe courts must apply customary
law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any
legislation that specifically deals with customary law."' This section
suggests that the principle of equality will supersede any aspect of
traditional law that violates that principle.' The supremacy of
equality in the face of a "cultural conflict" is clearly enunciated in
various sections of the Bill of Rights, and it appears to subvert any
claims by traditional authorities to discriminate against women.
Section 30 states, "[e]veryone has the right to use the language
and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exer-
cising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any
provision of the Bill of Rights.'"'3 Similarly, section 31 provides that
[plersons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic
community may not be denied the right, with other
members of the community (a) to enjoy their culture,
practice their religion and use their language and (b) to
form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic
associations and other organs of civil society.32
These rights, however, may not be exercised in a manner inconsis-
tent with the principle of equality. ' 33 The Bill of Rights also makes
provision for legislation that recognizes "(i) marriages concluded
under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family law;
or (ii) systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or
adhered to by persons professing a particular religion."' ' However,
recognition of these systems may not conflict with the principle of
equality.3's The Constitution makes provision for a Commission for
the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious,
and Linguistic Communities'3 and exhorts that the composition of
128. S. AFR. CONST. §§ 211-12.
129. Id. § 211(3) (emphasis added).
130. For a comprehensive discussion on the principle of equality see Catherine
Albertyn & Janet Kentridge, Introducing the Right to Equality in the Interim
Constitution, 10 S. AFR. J. HuM. RTS. 149 (1994).
131. S. AFR. CONST. § 30.
132. Id. § 31(1).
133. Id. § 31(2).
134. Id. § 15(3)(a).
135. Id. § 15(3)(b).
136. Id. § 185. The Constitution also provides that
[t]he right of the South African people as a whole to self-
determination, as manifested in this Constitution, does not preclude,
within the framework of this right, recognition of the notion of the
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the Commission "broadly reflect the gender composition of South
Africa. ,137
In addition to the substance of the rights promised in the Bill
of Rights, the interpretation of these rights by courts, tribunals, and
forums must comport with the Constitution's underlying ideals.'3
"When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the com-
mon law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights."' 39
Courts are also required to consider international law and may
consider foreign law.'40 Rights or freedoms incorporated in legisla-
tion, the common law, or customary law are acknowledged, unless
they contradict the values inherent in the Bill of Rights.14 1
VI. A POsT-APARTHEID VISION OF CUSTOMARY LAW
The constitutional balancing of women's rights and the insti-
tutions and structures of traditional law raises perennial questions
about the role of law in perpetuating cultural norms and values.14 In
South Africa, there remains the distance between the lofty ideals of
the Constitution and the reality of people's lives. The evolution of a
new legal culture cognizant of underlying African communitarian
values and judicious of women's rights will be a challenging en-
deavor1 4
It is undeniable that aspects of traditional law will continue to
govern the lives of many South Africans, particularly residents in the
rural areas. It seems apparent that despite the distortions that tradi-
tional institutions have historically suffered under colonialism and
right of self-determination of any community sharing a common
cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Re-
public or in any other way, determined by national legislation.
Id. § 235.
137. Id. § 186(2)(b).
138. Id. § 39(1) ("When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum
must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom.").
139. Id. § 39(2) (emphasis added).
140. Id. § 39(1)(bHc). In addition, Section 233 of the Constitution provides for the
application of international law in South Africa: "When interpreting any legislation,
every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is con-
sistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent
with international law:' Id. § 233.
141. Id. § 39(3).
142. Chanock, supra note 69.
143. In State v. Makwanye, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), the Constitutional Court made
substantial reference to "ubuntu," or traditional African values, and their significance
as part of the emerging jurisprudence in South Africa.
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apartheid, their legitimacy in certain rural communities remains
intact.'" In light of a possible conflict between the Constitution's
commitment to gender equality and the persistence of perceived
ancient customary practices, how might this conflict be resolved? A
few likely scenarios may emerge.
First, it is possible to conceive of the democratization of tradi-
tional leadership. It has been noted that the institution of the
chieftancy is conducive to democratization and that, instead of aboli-
tion, this democratization should be pursued. It has been
suggested that a thorough overhaul of the chieftancy be attempted,
including changes to hereditary succession, primogeniture, the
patriarchal basis, election, powers, period of office, government
imprimatur, skills acauisition, governing principles, and procedures
and judicial review.' These changes would be congruent with the
values of the new democratic state, and they would contribute
substantively and symbolically to the goals of gender equality.
14 7
The second scenario might witness the reconstruction of some
practices of customary law. This has been suggested in light of the
popularity and tenacity of certain customary practices. The institution
of lobolo is an interesting case in point. The practice remains univer-
sally popular in Southern Africa.14 9 It has been suggested that lobolo be
modified to accommodate modem urban conditions in South Africa,
and particularly the constitutional directive of gender equality. In-
stead of the payment being controlled by the father (and often having
the consequence of entrapping a woman in an unhappy marriage),
lobolo could be altered so that it takes on the form of security for a
woman when she is ill-treated or abandoned by her spouse.'w Similar
144. Mokgoro, supra note 50, at 63. Mokgoro asserts that
[a]lthough the institution of traditional leadership has historically
suffered political manipulation, abuse and exploitation at the hands
of successive colonial governments, a significant sector of rural so-
cieties, particularly in the former homelands, still cherishes the
system. Some progressive traditional leaders also still maintain the
loyalty and respect of their communities.
Id.
145. See Motshabi & Volks, supra note 68, at 104. See generally Mokgoro, supra note
50 (harmonizing tradition of authority structures and gender equality).
146. Motshabi & Volks, supra note 68, at 109-15.
147. Id.
148. See BENNETT, supra note 48, at 195 (describing lobolo, or "bride wealth:' as a
"transfer of property, usually livestock, by the husband ... to the wife's family as
part of the process of constituting a marriage").
149. Ncube, supra note 48, at 202-05.
150. Cf. Sandra Burman, Marriage Break up in South Africa: Holding Want at Bay?,
1 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 206 (1987) (investigating the effects of discriminatory laws
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approaches in relation to access to property, custody and guardianship,
and other areas of personal rights may arguably pass constitutional mus-
ter in relation to women's rights."'
The third scenario is the gradual phasing out of certain prac-
tices. This reflects the experience of many post-colonial societies
where social and economic changes render certain customary
practices inappropriate or irrelevant.5 2 Particularly with respect to
women, the increased access to education and all the prospective
benefits of the new non-racial and non-sexist order might result in
women having the economic status and capacity to make real
choices about the laws which govern them.
The reality of customary law is manifested in everyone's daily
experiences.'3 Ultimately, African communities and individuals will
renegotiate traditional practices to accommodate the changing
political, economic, and cultural environment. There may be room
for laws and the legal process, but in order for the legal compact
agreed to and enshrined in the Bill of Rights to succeed in trans-
forming the lives of women, it must be bolstered by widespread
attitudinal change.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to show that the intervention of
South African women at the constitutional negotiations in the early
1990s came on the heels of global campaigns by feminists to change
the international human rights framework to recognize the rights of
women globally. Such campaigns represented two major develop-
ments: (1) limited success of Western feminists to alter their legal
and policy landscapes to accommodate the needs of women in those
respective societies, and (2) democratic struggles in the developing
world in which large numbers of women were involved. An inter-
play of these factors influenced the manner in which South African
women chose to intervene to ensure that the Constitution incorpo-
rated women's rights.
governing the courts, employment, housing, welfare grants, the legal recognition of
different forms of marriage, and urban rights).
151. See T.W. Bennett, The Compatibility of African Customary Law and Human
Rights, 1991 AcTA JURIDICA 18, 26-27 (analyzing the conflict between constitutional
and customary law in these areas of personal rights).
152. See Ojwang, supra note 48, at 88; see also Michael P. Seng, In a Conflict Between
Equal Rights for Women and Customary Law, the Botswana Court of Appeal Chooses
Equality, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 563 (1993) (discussing the changing status of women in
Botswana).
153. For a definition of customary law and a discussion of the dynamic nature of
custom, see Chanock, supra note 69, at 54.
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The impact of Anglo-American feminist jurisprudence in legal
scholarship in South Africa has not been insignificant, although such
impact has generally been confined to White feminist academics. 1s
The formation of a democratic non-sexist society has taken shape in
a situation deeply stratified by race and class, where the claims of
White feminists might lack a certain universality."" Building on
developments in the Third World, and particularly African coun-
tries, South African women chose to frame the constitutional rights
to accommodate the needs and aspirations of South Africa's diverse
and unequally situated women.
For reasons outlined in Part V above, the transformation of
African customary law raises complicated and awkward questions.
The broad coalition of women and the process leading to the
Women's Charter, which incorporated the demands of women
throughout South Africa, capitalized on the admirable skills that
women had harnessed during the years of political struggle against
apartheid."' What South African women have accomplished has
been to incorporate a contextualized Western feminism into an
African version of women's equality to accommodate the complexity
of the transformation agenda with respect to customary law.",
154. See generally Felicity Kaganis & Christina Murray, Law and Women's Rights in
South Africa: An Overview, in GENDER AND THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER,
supra note 1, at 27 (discussing current feminist legal scholarship in South Africa in
the context of debates about feminist jurisprudence).
155. Dorothy Driver, The ANC Constitutional Guidelines in Process: A Feminist
Reading, in PUrrING WOMEN ON THE AGENDA, supra note 37, at 82, 90-92; see also
Linda Zama, Theories of Equality: Some Thoughts for South Africa, in PUrrING WOMEN
ON THE AGENDA, supra note 37, at 57 (looking briefly into the nature of the struggle of
women for equality and making some suggestions for the future).
156. See Brigitte Mabandla, Promoting Gender Equality in South Africa, in PUTTING
WOMEN ON THE AGENDA, supra note 37, at 75, 76 (outlining how women can insure
that their rights are protected and their interests promoted).
157. See supra note t. "Striking the rock" relates to the dramatic organizing efforts
of women in the years following the anti-pass campaigns of the 1950s. The phrase is
a tribute to the tenaciousness of Black women in the face of oppression, and it sym-
bolizes the continued determination of women to confront such oppression at great
personal cost. For examples of how "striking the rock" is symbolized in the accounts
of Black women detailing their struggles against oppression, refer to WINNIE
MANDELA, PART OF MY SOuL (Anne Benjamin ed., 1985) (describing her underground
political work and fight against the government since the late 1950s). See also ELLEN
KUZWAYO, CALL ME WOMAN (1985) (detailing her evolution as a politically active
Black woman in South Africa). "Striking the rock" is largely documented. See, e.g.,
CHERRYL WALKER, WOMEN AND RESISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA (1982) (tracking the
development of a woman's movement in South Africa from 1910 until the early
1960s); see also, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note t (discussing the continuing defiance of
women in the face of intense repression of their voice).
158. Frene Ginwala, Women and the Elephant: The Need to Redress Gender Oppres-
sion, in PlrrING WOMEN ON THE AGENDA, supra note 37, at 62, 68.
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Striking the Rock
In South Africa, it is in the law's domain that the distortion
of customary law occurred. The codification of customary law
inevitably fossilized age-old practices and institutions that
evolved and accommodated changing times and circumstances.
A whole host of factors, most markedly the process of urbaniza-
tion, had major repercussions for all things customary. However,
the accommodation of such factors did not suit successive colo-
nial and apartheid governments for whom African customary
law was merely an extension of the segregationist and apartheid
legal apparatus."9
The new constitutional order now provides the opportunity
for African traditional law to reflect the aspirations of all its adher-
ents in line with the democratic ideals espoused in the Bill of Rights.
This legal moment in South African history provides the paradigm
for a creative and vigorous advocacy and constitutional interpreta-
tion of gender equality. In this endeavor, non-legal methods should
be utilized"W so that the formal transformation mandated by the
Constitution occurs alongside social, economic, and attitudinal
transformation. Not only are these vital safeguards for women, but a
thorough assessment of possible inconsistencies between gender
equality and traditional law allows the South African legal system
to revisit, and possibly improve on, a constant preoccupation of
decolonized democracies.
Whatever the shape of the rights embodied in the Constitu-
tion, and however strong the promise of equality, enforcement will
ultimately depend on a combination of factors: (1) the commitment
of the government to the principles and rights embodied in the
Constitution; (2) the interpretation of such rights and principles by
sympathetic and sensitive adjudicators who will not ignore the
historical legacy and the social, economic, and cultural realities of
South Africa; and (3) the continued vigilance by all South Africans
who yearn for a society free from oppression of and discrimination
against women.
159. Martin Chanock, Writing South African Legal History: A Prospectus, in J. AFR.
HIST. 265 (1989) (discussing the workings of the South African legal system).
160. South Africa has always had a vibrant non-governmental sector. The decades
leading to the democratic elections saw innovative tactics utilized by activist organi-
zations and trade unions engaged in a host of grassroots activities. See generally
APARTHEID IN CRIsis (Mark A. Uhlig ed., 1986) (detailing the wide range of groups
working in the anti-apartheid cause and different strategies adopted). Therefore,
besides the litigation for equality that the Constitution now provides for, other non-
legal methods may be appropriate as well in attaining the same goals. Such methods
may include educational campaigns in the media, the dissemination of literature in
the workplace, and continuing interaction with the public by governmental depart-
ments through vehicles like school programs or community workshops.
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